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William F. Stewart. The Embattled General: Sir Richard Turner and
the First World War. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2015. Pp. 374.
This book is long overdue, not because its author took too long to
write it but because Canada’s generals have been neglected in the
growing historiography of the First World War, with the obvious
exception of Arthur Currie. Certainly they are discussed in the
standard works such as Tim Cook’s two volumes on the army and
other books, but why, a century later, are there no biographical
studies of Watson, Lipsett, Loomis, Macdonell and the rest?
Happily, we now have a serious examination of Richard Turner, the
second most important (but technically highest ranking) Canadian
general in the war. Like the others, Turner has long been neglected
but more than the others, he merited a biography because he was
controversial. The outline of his story is well-known: as a wealthy
businessman active in the prewar militia, he rose rapidly through the
ranks because of his political connections, was given command of a
brigade in 1914, then a division, and proves in both positions to be
not up to the task, so he was shunted off to an administrative post in
England where he could do no more harm.
But is this a fair summary in fact? William Stewart does
not think so and he offers another view in this well-written and
forcefully argued book, which originated as a doctoral dissertation
at the University of Birmingham. Taking an innovative—at least in
Canada—approach, he bases his assessment of Turner on the criteria
used in the us army’s leadership manual, modified to account for the
different expectations and context of the First World War. Stewart
also claims that he has based the book on the correspondence files of
Major General John Carson, Sam Hughes’ “Special Representative”
in England, the personnel correspondence of the Overseas Ministry
of Military Forces, and the extensive volumes on administration in
England that “have been hitherto virtually untouched” (p. 5). He also
claims to be the first historian to use Sir Edward Kemp’s files “in
almost their entirety” (p. 7).
Perhaps not surprisingly, Stewart concludes that Turner rates
well by the criteria of the us army’s leadership manual, although he
does concede errors of judgment from time to time and acknowledges
Turner’s tendency to irascibility on occasion. He examines Turner’s
two major failures—at Second Ypres and St Eloi—in great detail
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and demonstrates that both were very difficult complex situations, at
the time and in retrospect. With regard to Second Ypres, he seems
unnecessarily defensive. The simple reality was that both Turner
and his troops were inexperienced in April 1915 and they found
themselves in an appalling situation that was unprecedented even
to experienced officers and men. Turner unquestionably made errors
but he was receiving terse handwritten directives from his divisional
general Edwin Alderson delivered by runner in the midst of a crisis,
so it is arguable that he was not entirely at fault if he misunderstood
them.
It is useful to recall that Currie, in the same situation, actually
left his headquarters and went back to 27th Divisional headquarters
to try to persuade General Thomas Snow that the situation was
worse than he realised. Snow was appalled, and wanted him sacked
for leaving the battle. Snow, it should be noted, had come close to
being sacked in September 1914 for his performance in the early
part of the war. If Currie had been removed from his command,
the history of the Canadian Corps would probably have been much
different from what it was. The point is that the revered Currie, like
Turner, did not perform too well in his baptism of fire either. Nor did
other officers such as the 15th Battalion’s Lieutenant Colonel J.A.
Currie, who completely collapsed. These men, for all their militia
experience, had no real idea of what modern war was like. Some
could not handle it, some could, and some were shaky at first but
improved with experience.
Currie obviously improved with experience. Did Turner? His
failure at St Eloi has consistently been cited to show that he did not,
even though those who were there—and historians in retrospect—
agree that St Eloi was an unmitigated disaster from start to finish
in which Turner again had to use inexperienced troops to relieve
exhausted British troops, fighting in water and mud that was waistdeep and worse. It was true that Turner and his staff misread
photographs of the craters but so did British intelligence, and we all
know that senior officers trying to command from behind the lines
were almost always essentially out of touch in this war.
Stewart offers a spirited defence of Turner’s performance in light
of the extraordinary situation he faced at St Eloi but also argues that
Turner was on a learning curve, noting that his division achieved the
only success of the Somme offensive and the first Allied victory of
the war when it captured Courcelette in September 1916. A couple of
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months later he was appointed goc of Canadian troops in England,
ending his career as a field officer.
By the autumn of 1916 Borden recognized that the administration
and training of the troops in England was being so badly mismanaged
and that relations with British military authorities were so difficult,
that action had to be taken. Displaying untypical creativity, he
established the Ministry of Overseas Forces and appointed the
solid and trusted Sir George Perley as minister. He then sacked
Major General John Carson, Hughes’ representative in London and
appointed Turner to head the Canadian army in England and to
advise Perley. This appointment has consistently been viewed as a
demotion (although actually he was promoted) and Turner certainly
would have preferred to remain in the field. That it was not a demotion
is indicated by the fact that Byng first recommended Currie, his
protégé, for the post. The appointment of Turner, while it removed
a commanding officer about whom Byng had reservations, was a
brilliant move because Perley needed an experienced combat general
with strong administrative ability to advise him and take charge of
the army in England. Borden completed the reorganization of the
army’s management by finally sacking Sam Hughes and replacing
him with the competent Sir Edward Kemp.
Turner was a great success in England. Historians acknowledge
that the Canadian Corps became an effective fighting force in
1917 and 1918. Describing the Canadian Corps in April as “a
disorganized rabble,” Denis Winter has argued that, by mid-1917, it
had become “much the most effective unit in the bef.”1 The credit
for this transformation is usually given to Currie but he only became
commanding officer of the Corps in June 1917. It is reasonable,
therefore, to accept Stewart’s assertion that Currie’s successes in 1917
and 1918 were to some extent dependent on Turner’s reorganization
and reform of Canadian military administration in England.
Turner’s record in England was impressive. He cleaned up
“Hughes’ bureaucratic labyrinth with sure handed professionalism,”
(p. 27) standardized and updated the infantry’s training syllabus,
sent home or to France a host of surplus officers, cleared out the
log jam of reinforcements at the depot battalions, and mediated
the medical corps’ continual bickering. He worked well with Perley
as his military advisor and, despite their rivalry until Currie was
1

Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London, 1991), 131.
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appointed commanding officer of the Canadian Corps in the spring
of 1917 and Currie’s belief that Turner was undercutting him at army
headquarters, Turner supported Currie on every major issue, most
significantly on the issue of reducing the size of divisions in the spring
of 1918 and the controversial break-up of the 5th Division.
Stewart has made a valuable contribution to our understanding
not only of Richard Turner’s career but also to the importance of
the management of the army in England, and Turner’s contribution
to improving it, to the effectiveness of the Canadian Corps in the
field. This takes nothing away from Currie’s contribution but places
it in context. Stewart makes the case that Turner’s experience in the
war “was unique … in that it included senior command in both the
combat arms and administration” (p. 3). It is further true that most
publications on Canada’s role in the war “have focused on the active
front to the neglect of the essential role of training and administration
in England, as well as support units in France and Belgium” (p. 5).
Historians will continue to debate whether he was incompetent
as a field commander or just unlucky because he has been judged on
the basis of two very difficult battles that took place early in the war,
but somehow receives scant credit for the success at Courcelette. But
a senior general with field experience was needed for the exceedingly
important task in London and the choice of credible candidates
was pretty much limited to Currie or Turner. Currie, as Stewart
concedes, was a better field commander than Turner and had the full
confidence of Haig, while Turner did not. The result was that a wise
appointment appeared, at least to those who think wars are won only
on the battlefield, to be a dismissal.
The tragedy is not that Turner was pulled from the field and
given an administrative position in England, but that historians have
too casually dismissed him as a failure and not appreciated that
modern warfare depends on organization, training, and the making
sure that those in the field have what they need. We are indebted
to William Stewart for pointing this out in this well written and
provocative book.
brian douglass tennyson , cape breton university
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